David Weinstein, a researcher at NowSecure, has posted a blog titled “Ruminations on App CVEs“. Thanks to Will Dormann’s Tweet it came to our attention, and he is correct! We have opinions on this. Quoted material below is from Weinstein’s blog unless otherwise attributed.
CVE is well-positioned to play a critical role in tracking the risk level of mobile computing.
This is trivially to debate and counter in 2015. Until last year, CVE maintained a public list of sources that was virtually unchanged since its inception in 1999. After pressure from the public and the CVE Editorial Board, compromised of non-MITRE industry “advisors”, CVE revised their coverage policy and shifted to a new system of ‘full’ or ‘partial’ coverage based on the vendor, product, and/or vulnerability source. On the surface, this list looks promising, but upon any significant scrutiny, it is utterly lacking in adequate coverage. In order to head off complaints, their webpage even qualifies ‘full coverage’ sources by using the phrasing “nearly all issues disclosed” to “allow the flexibility to potentially postpone coverage of minor issues”.
In fact, Steve Christey may disagree with your assertion. In 2013, he posted to the VIM list saying:
Unfortunately, CVE can no longer guarantee full coverage of all public vulnerabilities… we are not well-prepared to handle the full volume of CVEs for all publicly-disclosed vulnerabilities… – Steve Christey, Editor of CVE
Given the 39,280 vulnerabilities we track that do not have a CVE assignment, assignment volume is specifically a problem for them. Further, the current state of CVE assignments is a disaster, and I have been in mails with CVE staff actively encouraging them to figure out the problem, as my now 27 day wait for three different CVE assignments is getting ridiculous.
However, CVEs have largely focused on tracking server-side and related flaws and yet the security community has evolved to track client-side vulnerabilities as a critical aspect of dealing with risk.
While I can’t offer you a set of handy statistics to back this claim, know that CVE, or their CNAs, assign identifiers to a considerable number of client applications. In fact, with the release of Apple iOS 9 yesterday, the public learned of 91 _new_ vulnerabilities affecting the platform, many of them client-side. I do not believe this statement to be a fair criticism of CVE’s assignment history and policy.
While CVE has worked well for tracking system flaws in mobile operating systems, there remain quirks with regard to mobile app flaws.
There are around 90 vulnerabilities in Google Android alone, that do not have CVE assignments, and that represents a fairly significant percentage overall. However, in this case we can’t blame CVE at all for this shortcoming, as the fault lies entirely with Google instead.
It seems like using CVE is the “right thing” here but MITRE has been very cryptic (in my opinion) about what qualifies as something that gets a CVE and what doesn’t. These discussions should not happen in some closed door meeting in my opinion, or at least should not end there…
First, please factor in that CVE and every other vulnerability database has gone through a world of headache, dealing with researchers who do not fully understand the concept of ‘crossing privilege boundaries’. The number of “not-a-vuln” vulnerability reports we see has skyrocketed this year. Further, even from individuals that are very technical, don’t always convey their information in terms that are easily understood. They clearly see a vulnerability, the report they send doesn’t show it to our eyes. It requires back-and-forth to figure it out and better understand the exact vulnerability. Bottom line, some are clear-cut cases and typically get a quick assignment. Other cases are murky at best.
Second, I fully agree that such a discussion should not be behind closed doors. At the very least, it should include the CVE editorial board, and ideally should include anyone in the industry who has an interest in it. If you want to bring up the discussion on the VIM mail list, which has over one hundred members, including at least one person from each of the major public vulnerability databases, please do.
Is MITRE consistently responding to other researchers’ requests for CVEs?
No. The turnaround time for requesting a CVE has gone up considerably. As mentioned above, I have been waiting for three assignments for almost one month now, while CVE assigned two others filed on the same day within hours. They are not currently consistent with the same researcher, even one familiar with CVE and their abstraction and assignment policy.
Attaching a CVE to a vulnerable app, even if it’s an old version, is actually a big part of tracking the reputation of the developer as well!
Just quoting to signal-boost this, as it is a very important comment, and absolutely true.
Who acts as a certified numbering authority (CNA) on behalf of all the app developers on the market?
Based on the current list of CNAs, there is no CNA that covers third-party apps really, regardless of platform. Also note that many CNAs are not currently fulfilling their duties properly, and I have been trying to address this with MITRE for months. There is no current policy on filing a complaint against a CNA, there is no method for warning or revoking CNA status, and MITRE has dropped the ball replying to me on several different threads on this topic.
Should Google step in here as a formal body to assist with coordinating CVEs etc for these apps?
Absolutely not. While they are positioned to be the ideal CNA, their history in CVE assignments has been dismal. Further, they have so many diverse products, each with their own mechanism for bug reporting (if one exists), own disclosure policy (if one exists), and disclosure method (which doesn’t exist for many). We can’t rely on Google to disclose the vulnerabilities, let alone act as a CNA for standardized and formalized ID assignment. Could Google fix this? Absolutely. They are obviously overflowing with brilliant individuals. However, this would require a central security body in the company that crosses all departments, and fulfills such a duty. Due to the volume of software and vulnerabilities they deal with, it would require a small team. The same kind that IBM, Cisco, and other large companies already stand up and have used for years.
Is the process MITRE established designed and prepared to handle the mountain of bugs that will be thrown at it when the community really focuses on this problem as we have?
No, as covered above. CVE is already backpedaling on coverage, and has been for a couple years. That does not give any level of comfort that they would be willing to, or even could handle such a workload.
Can the community better crowd source this effort with confirmation of vulnerability reporting in a more scalable and distributed manner that doesn’t place a single entity in a potentially critical path?
Possibly. However, in the context of mobile, Google is a better choice than crowd-sourcing via the community. The community largely doesn’t understand the standards and abstraction policy that helps define CVE and the value. Many CNAs do not either unfortunately, despite them being in the best position to handle such assignments. Moving to a model that relies on more trusted CNAs has merit, but it would also require better documentation and training from MITRE to ensure the CNA follows the standards.
Every vendor distributing an app on the Play Store should be required to provide a security related contact e.g., firstname.lastname@example.org
Except, statistically, I bet that not even half of them have a domain! The app stores are full of a wide variety of applications that are little more than a hobby of one person. They don’t get a web page or a formal anything. Given the raw number of apps, that is also a tall order. Maybe apps that enjoy a certain amount of success (via download count?) would then be subjected to such rules?
Google could be a little clearer about when email@example.com should be used for organized disclosure of bugs and consider taking a stronger position in the process.
“Little clearer” is being more than generous. Remember, until a month or two ago, they had no formal place or process to make announcements of security updates. Disclosures related to Android have been all over the board and it is clear that Google has no process around it.
MITRE and/or whoever runs CVE these days should clarify what is appropriate for CVEs so that we know where we should be investing our efforts
Absolutely, and CVE’s documentation the last decade or more has not been properly updated. Having such documentation would also potentially cut down on their headache, as requests are made for issues clearly not a vulnerability. But newcomers to security research don’t have a well-written guide that explain it.
Should we pursue a decentralized CVE request process based on crowdsourcing and reputation?
I cannot begin to imagine what this would entail or what you have in mind. On the surface, won’t happen, won’t work.
Hopefully others in the industry chime in on this discussion, and again, I encourage you to take it to the CVE Editorial Board and the VIM list, to solicit feedback from more. I appreciate you bringing this topic up and getting it attention.
This post is in response to the drama the last few days, where Mary Ann Davidson posted an inflammatory blog about security researchers that send Oracle vulnerabilities while violating their End-user License Agreement (EULA… that thing you click without reading for every piece of software you install). The post was deleted promptly by Oracle, then Oracle said it was not the corporate line, and due to the crazy journalists who of course felt obligated to cover. You can read up on the background elsewhere, because it has absolutely no bearing on reality, which this very brief blog covers.
This is such an absurdly simple concept to grasp, yet the CISO of Oracle (among others) are oblivious to it. Part of me wants to write a scathing 8 page “someone is wrong on the Internet” blog. The other part of me says sleep is more valuable than dealing with these mouth-breathing idiots, which Davidson is one of. Sleep will win, so here is the cold hard facts and reality of the situation. Anything else should be debated at some obscure academic conference, but we know Oracle pays big money to debate it to politicians. Think about that.
Reality #1: Now, let’s start with an age-old saying… “when chinchillas are outlawed, only outlaws will have chinchillas.” Fundamentally, the simple fact that cannot be argued by any rational, logical human, is that laws apply to law-abiding citizens. Those who break the law (i.e. criminal, malefactor, evildoer, transgressor, culprit, felon, crook, hoodlum, gangster, whatever…) do not follow laws. Those who ignore criminal law, likely do not give two fucks about civil law, which a EULA violation would fall under.
Reality #2: Researchers get access to crappy Oracle software in the process of performing their job duties. A penetration test or audit may give them temporary access, and they may find a vulnerability. If the client doesn’t mandate they keep it in-house, the researcher may opt to share it with the vendor, doing the right thing. Where exactly does the EULA fit in here? It was agreed to by the customer, not the third-party researcher. Even if there is a provision in the EULA for such a case, if the company doesn’t warn the researcher of said provision, how can they be held liable?
Reality #3: Tying back into #1 here, what are the real consequences? This is civil law, not criminal. When it comes to criminal law, which is a lot more clear, the U.S. doesn’t have solid extradition case-law backing them. We tend to think “run to Argentina!” when it comes to evading U.S. law. In reality, you can possibly just run to the U.K. instead. Ignore the consequences, that is not relevant when it comes to the law in this context. If you focus on “oh but the death penalty was involved”, you are not understanding Law 101.
In the case of Soering v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the United Kingdom was not permitted under its treaty obligations to extradite an individual to the United States, because the United States’ federal government was constitutionally unable to offer binding assurances that the death penalty would not be sought in Virginia courts.
Now, consider all of the countries that have no extradition treaty with the U.S. There are a lot. How many? Think less on the volume, think more on how well-known this is… a quick Google shows that U.S. news tells us where to run! CNBC says “10 hideout cities for fugitives” and DailyFinance says “Know Where to Run to: The 5 Best Countries With No Extradition“. Not enough? Let’s look at the absolute brilliance that local news can deliver, since my search was intended to find a short list of countries with no extradition, and Wikipedia failed me. Leave it to WSFA 12 in Alabama, to give us a very concise list of countries with no extradition treaty with the US! Criminals, send a spoofed email of thanks to this station for cliff-noting this shit.
These countries currently have no extradition treaty with the United States:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central
African Republic, Chad, Mainland China, Comoros, Congo (Kinshasa), Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, São Tomé & Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vatican, Vietnam and Yemen.
Now, can anyone arguing in favor of Davidson’s “EULA speech”, that Oracle officially disagreed with, explain how a EULA protects a company in any way, in a real-world scenario?
Quite simply, there are two major issues at play. First, the absurd idea that a EULA will protect you from anything, other than chasing Intellectual Property (IP) lawsuits against other companies. That happens a lot, to be sure. But it has no bearing, in any way, on security research.
Second, I think back to something an old drunk friend told me a few times. “Never lick a gift-whore in the mouse.” I said he was a drunk friend. Security researchers who ply their trade, find vulnerabilities in your product, report them to you, and wait for you to release a patch? Embrace them. Hug them. Pay them if you can. They are your allies… and every vulnerability they help you squash, is one less vulnerability a bad guy can use to pop your customers. No one in their right mind would ever alienate such a process.
Yesterday, we experienced a catastrophic failure on the primary system hosting OSVDB that initially appears to be related to a drive failure. We are working with our hosting provider but have yet to determine root cause and we currently do not have an ETA as to when the site will be restored.
6/12/2015 Update: After fighting with the disks, the site has been restored and functioning. Apologies for the downtime!
6/14/2015 Update: Days after getting it fixed, the box tanked again. We’re working on it, while cursing technology.
8/3/2015 Update: The system has been back up since ~ 6/16. We just spaced it and forgot to update the blog. Apologies!
Recently, the Verizon 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) was released to much fanfare as usual, prompting a variety of media outlets to analyze the analysis. A few days after the release, I caught a Tweet linking to a blog from @raesene (Rory McCune) that challenged one aspect of the report. On page 16 of the report, Verizon lists the top 10 CVE ID exploited.
The bottom of the table says “Top 10 CVEs Exploited” which can be interpreted many ways. The paragraph above qualifies it as the “ten CVEs account for almost 97% of the exploits observed in 2014“. This is problematic because neither fully explains what that means. Is this the top 10 detected from sensors around the world? Meaning the exploits were launched and detected, with no indication if they were successful? Or does this mean these are the top ten exploits that were launched and resulted in a successful compromise of some form?
This gets more confusing when you read McCune’s blog that lists out what those ten CVE correspond to. I’ll get to the one that drew his attention, but will start with a different one. CVE-1999-0517 is an identifier for “an SNMP community name is the default (e.g. public), null, or missing.” This is very curious CVE identifier related to SNMP as it is specific to a default string. Any device that has a default community name, but does not allow remote manipulation is a rather trivial information disclosure vulnerability. This begins to speak to what the chart means, as “exploit” is being used in a broad fashion and does not track to the usage many in our industry associate with it. McCune goes on to point another on their list, CVE-2001-0540 which is an identifier for a “memory leak in Terminal servers in Windows NT and Windows 2000 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory exhaustion) via a large number of malformed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) requests to port 3389“. This is considerably more specific, giving us affected operating systems and the ultimate impact; a denial of service. This brings us back to why this section is in the report when part (or all) of it has nothing to do with actual breaches. After these two, McCune points out numerous other issues that directly challenge how this data was generated.
Since Verizon does not explain their methodology in generating these numbers, we’re left with our best guesses and a small attempt at an explanation via Twitter, that leads to as many questions as answers. You can read the full Twitter chat between @raesene, @vzdbir, and @mroytman (RiskIO Data Scientist who provided the data to generate this section of the report). The two pages of ‘methodology’ Verizon provides in the report (pages 59-60) are too high-level to be useful for the section mentioned above. Even after the conversation, the ‘top 10 exploited’ is still highly suspicious and does not seem accurate. The final bit from Roytman may make sense in RiskIO’s world, but doesn’t to others in the vulnerability world.
That brings me to the first vulnerability McCune pointed out, that started a four hour rabbit hole journey for me last night. From his blog:
The best example of this problem is CVE-2002-1931 which gets listed at number nine. This is a Cross-Site Scripting issue in version 2.1.1 and 1.1.3 of a product called PHP Arena and specifically the pafileDB area of that product. Now I struggled to find out too much about that product because the site that used to host it http://www.phparena.net is now a gambling site (I presume that the domain name lapsed and was picked up as it got decent traffic). Searching via google for information, most of the results seemed to be from vulnerability databases(!) and using a google dork of inurl:pafiledb shows a total of 156 results, which seems low for one of the most exploited issues on the Internet.
This prompted me to look at CVE-2002-1931 and the corresponding OSVDB entry. Then I looked at the ‘pafiledb.php’ cross-site scripting issues in general, and immediately noticed problems:
This is a good testament to how far vulnerability databases (VDBs) have come over the years, and how our data earlier on is not so hot sometimes. Regardless of vulnerability age, I want database completeness and accuracy so I set out to fix it. What I thought would be a simple 15 minute fix took much longer. After reading the original disclosures of a few early paFileDB XSS issues, it became clear that the one visible script being tested was actually more complex, and calling additional PHP files. It also became quite clear that several databases, ours included, had mixed up references and done a poor job abstracting. Next step, take extensive notes on every disclosure including dates, exploit strings, versions affected, solution if available, and more. The rough notes for some, but not all of the issues to give a feel for what this entails:
Going back to this script being ‘more complex’, and to try to answer some questions about the disclosure, the next trick was to find a copy of paFileDB 3.1 or before to see what it entailed. This is harder than it sounds, given the age of the software and the fact the vendor site has been gone for seven years or more. With the archive finally in hand, it became more clear what the various ‘action’ parameters really meant.
Going through each disclosure and following links to links, it also became obvious that every VDB missed the inclusion of some disclosures, and/or did not properly abstract them. To be fair, many VDBs have modified their abstraction rules over the years, including us. So using today’s standards along with yesterday’s data, we get a very different picture of those same XSS vulnerabilities:
With this in mind, reconsider the Verizon report that says CVE-2002-1931 is a top 10 exploited vulnerability in 2014. That CVE is very specific, based on a 2002-10-20 disclosure that starts out referring to a vulnerability that we don’t have details on. Either it was publicly disclosed and the VDBs missed it, it was mentioned on the vendor site somewhere (and doesn’t appear to be there now, even with the great help of archive.org), or it was mentioned in private or restricted channels, but known to some. We’re left with what that Oct, 2002 post said:
We know it is “pafiledb.php” only because that is the base script that in turn calls others. In reality, based on the other digging, it is very likely making a call to includes/search.php which contains the vulnerability. Without performing a code-level analysis, we can only include a technical note with our submission and move on. Continuing the train of thought, what data collection methods are being performed that assign that CVE to an attack that does not appear to be publicly disclosed? The vulnerability scanners from around that time, many of which are still used today, do not specifically test for and exploit that issue. Rather, they look for the additional three XSS disclosed in the same post further down. All three “pafiledb.php” exploits that call a specific action that correspond to /includes/rate.php, /includes/download.php, and /includes/email.php. It is logical that intrusion detection systems and vulnerability scanners would be looking for those three issues (likely lumped into one ID), but not the vague “search string” issue.
McCune’s observation and singling this vulnerability out is spot on. While he questioned the data in a different way, my method gives additional evidence that the ‘top 10’ is built on faulty data at best. I hope that this blog is both educational from the VDB side of things, and further encourages Verizon to be more forthcoming with their methodology for this data. As it stands, it simply isn’t trustworthy.
It’s that time of year again! Vulnerability databases whip up reports touting statistics and observations based on their last year of collecting data. It’s understandable, especially for a commercial database, to show why your data source is the best. In the past, we haven’t had a strong desire to whip up a flashy PDF with our take on vulnerability disclosure statistics. Instead, we’ve focused more on educating others on why their statistics are often so horribly wrong or misleading. It should come as no surprise then, as we find ourselves forced to point out the errors in Secunia’s ways. We did the same thing last year in a long blog, giving more perspective and our own numbers for balance.
After reading this year’s report from Secunia, we could basically use last year’s blog as a template and just plug in new numbers. Instead, it is important to point out that after last year’s review, Secunia opted not to revise their methodology. Worse, they did not take any pointers from a presentation on vulnerability statistics Steve Christey (CVE / MITRE) and I did at BlackHat before last year’s report, pointing out the most common flaws in statistics and where the bias comes from. It is easy to chalk up last year’s report as being naive and not fully appreciating or understanding such statistics. This year though, they have no excuse. The numbers they report seem purposefully misleading and are a disservice to their customers and the community.
The headline of their press release and crux of their report is that they identified 15,435 vulnerabilities in 2014. This is entirely inaccurate, and completely misleading. This is fundamentally due to the same very flawed methodology they used last year, where they count a single vulnerability as many as 210 times (e.g. this year CVE-2014-0160, aka Heartbleed). Then factor in all of the other high profile “logo” vulnerabilities (e.g. FREAK, ShellShock), especially in OpenSSL, and the same handful of vulnerabilities will get counted hundreds or even a thousand times. To be abundantly clear, a vulnerability in a third-party library such as OpenSSL is one vulnerability. It doesn’t matter how many other products use and integrate that code, the fundamental flaw is in the library. Counting each product that implements OpenSSL as a distinct vulnerability, rather than a distinct occurrence of a vulnerability, is wrong. Worse, it actually highlights just how poor their statistics are, if you do accept their flawed methodology, as it is heavily used among thousands of applications that Secunia doesn’t cover, even when a vendor like IBM issues numerous advisories that they miss. No matter how you cut it, their numbers are invalid.
So poking at our database, understanding we don’t quite have a 100% mapping to Secunia, but feel it is pretty close, we see that around 5,280 of our entries have a Secunia reference and 4,530 of those also have a CVE reference (compared to more than 8,500 entries we have with a CVE reference). Even counting for a good margin of error, it still appears that Secunia does not cover almost 3,000 vulnerabilities in 2014, which are covered by CVE entries. Those familiar with this blog know that we are more critical of CVE than any other Vulnerability Database. If a commercial VDB with hundreds of high-dollar clients can’t even keep a 100% mapping with an over-funded, U.S. government run VDB that is considered the “lowest common denominator” by many, that speaks volumes. I could end the blog on that note alone, because anything less than mediocrity is a disgrace. How do you trust, and pay for, a vulnerability intelligence service missing thousands of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities, that are served up on a platter and available to anyone for free use and inclusion in their own database? You don’t. After all, remember this quote from the Secunia report last year?
CVE has become a de facto industry standard used to uniquely identify vulnerabilities, which have achieved wide acceptance in the security industry.
All of the above is not only important, it is absolutely critical to appropriately frame their statistics. Not only does Secunia avoid using the minimum industry standard for vulnerability aggregation, they opt to use their own methodology, which they now know beyond doubt seriously inflates their ‘vulnerability’ count. Last year, it was by almost three times more than reality. This year, it was also by about three times more than reality, as they only covered approximately 5,500 unique vulnerabilities. That is almost 3,000 less than CVE and 8,000 less than OSVDB. Any excuses of Secunia coverage lacking that are based on them claiming to verify vulnerabilities and “not covering vulnerabilities in beta software” are also invalid, as a majority of vulnerabilities reported are in stable software, and regularly come from trusted researchers or the vendors themselves. Regardless, it should be clear to anyone passingly familiar with the aggregation of vulnerabilities that Secunia is playing well outside the bounds of reality. Of course, every provider of vulnerability intelligence has some motive, or at least desire, to see the numbers go up year to year. It further justifies their customers spending money on the solution.
“Every year, we see an increase in the number of vulnerabilities discovered, emphasizing the need for organizations to stay on top of their environment. IT teams need to have complete visibility of the applications that are in use, and they need firm policies and procedures in place, in order to deal with the vulnerabilities as they are disclosed.” — Kasper Lindgaard, Director of Research and Security at Secunia.
While Mr. Lindgaard’s quote is flashy and compelling, it is also completely wrong, even according to their own historical reports. If Mr. Lindgaard had read Secunia’s own report from 2010 and 2011, he might have avoided this blunder.
This report presents global vulnerability data from the last five years and identifies trends found in 2010. The total number of vulnerabilities disclosed in 2010 shows a slight decrease of 3% compared to 2009. – Yearly Report 2010 (Secunia)
Analysing the long-term and short-term trends of all products from all vendors in the Secunia database over the last six years reveals that the total number of vulnerabilities decreased slightly in 2011 compared to 2010. – Vulnerabilities are Resilient (2011, Secunia Report)
In 2007 OSVDB cataloged 9,574 vulnerabilities as compared to 11,050 in 2006. In 2009 they cataloged 8,175 vulnerabilities as compared to 9,807 in 2008. In 2011 they cataloged 7,913 vulnerabilities compared to 9,161 in 2010. That is three distinct years that were not an increase at all. Taking Mr. Lindgaard’s quote into account, and comparing it to our own data that is based on a more standard method of abstraction, we also show that it has not been a steady rise every year:
With highly questionable statistics, based on a flawed methodology, Secunia also lucked out this year, as vendors are more prudent about reporting vulnerabilities in used third-party libraries (e.g. OpenSSL, PHP). This plays out nicely for a company that incorrectly counts each vendor’s use of vulnerable software as a distinct issue.
Getting down to the statistics they share, we’ll give a few additional perspectives. As with all vulnerability statistics, they should be properly explained and disclaimed, or they are essentially meaningless.
In 2014, a total of 15,435 vulnerabilities were discovered in 3,870 products from 500 vendors.
As stated previously, this is absolutely false. Rather than track unique vulnerabilities, Secunia’s model and methodology is to focus more on products and operating systems. For example, they will issue one advisory for a vulnerability in OpenSSL, then dozens of additional advisories for the exact same vulnerability. The only difference is that each subsequent advisory covers a product or operating system that uses it. Above I mentioned the redundant ‘HeartBleed’ entries, but to further illustrate the point and demonstrate how this practice can lead to wildly inaccurate statistics, let’s examine the OpenSSL ‘FREAK’ vulnerability as well (29 Secunia advisories). The flaw is in the OpenSSL code, not the implementation from each vendor, so it is still that same one vulnerability. Depending on how good their coverage is, this could be more problematic. Looking at IBM, who uses OpenSSL in a wide variety of their products, we know that at least 56 are impacted by the vulnerability, which may mean that many more Secunia advisories cover them. If we had a perfect glimpse into what products use OpenSSL, it would likely be thousands. Trying to suggest that is ‘thousands of unique vulnerabilities’ is simply ignorant.
83% of vulnerabilities in all products had patches available on the day of disclosure in 2014.
We assume that by ‘patches’, they mean a viable vendor-provided solution (e.g. upgrade) as well. Based on our aggregation, it is closer to 64% that have a solution available, and that is not counting “the day of disclosure”. That includes vendors who have patched since the issue was disclosed. This big gap comes from the number of vulnerabilities aggregated by each database since the start of 2014.
25 zero-day vulnerabilities were discovered in total in 2014, compared to 14 the year before.
Assuming we use the same definition of “zero-day” as Secunia, this is considerably under what we tracked. We flag such issues “discovered in the wild”, meaning the vulnerability was being actively exploited by attackers when it was discovered and/or disclosed. In 2014, we show 43 entries with this designation, compared to 73 in 2013. That is a sharp decrease, not increase. Part of that large swing for us comes from a rash of attacker-trojaned software distributions that were used to target mobile users in 2013. Since trojaned software from a legitimate vendor meets the criteria to be called a vulnerability (it can be abused by a bad actor to cross privilege boundaries), we include it where Secunia and other databases generally ignore it.
20 of the 25 zero-day vulnerabilities were discovered in the 25 most popular products – 7 of these in operating systems.
Since we got into the “popular products” bit in last year’s rebuttal to their statistics, we’ll skip that this year. However, in 2014 we show that 16 of those “zero day” were in Microsoft products (two in Windows, six in the bundled MSIE), and four were in Adobe products.
In 2014, 1,035 vulnerabilities were discovered in the 5 most popular browsers: Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, Opera and Safari. That is a 42% increase from 2013.
Without searching our data, it is likely very safe to say these numbers are way off, and that Secunia’s coverage of browser security is woefully behind. In addition to not aggregating as much data, they likely don’t properly take into account vulnerabilities in WebKit, which potentially affects Chrome, Safari, and Opera. Are WebKit vulnerabilities attributed to one, the other, or all three? With that in mind, let’s compare numbers. We see ~200 for Mozilla, ~250 for Microsoft IE, and not even 10 between Safari and Opera. In reality, Opera is not forthcoming in their information about vulnerabilities they patch, so their actual vulnerability count is likely much higher. That leaves us with Chrome, which had over 300 vulnerabilities in their own code. As mentioned, factor in another 100+ vulnerabilities in WebKit that may impact up to three browsers. That comes to a total of 889, far less than their claimed 1,035. That makes us curious if they are using the same flawed methodology with browser vulnerabilities, as they do with libraries (i.e. counting WebKit / Blink issues multiple times for each browser using it). Some vulnerabilities in these browsers are also due to flaws in other 3rd party libraries and not in the browsers’ own code (e.g. ICU4C and OpenJPEG). Finally, Google Chrome provides Adobe Flash Player, so is Secunia adding the number of vulnerabilities addressed in Flash Player to their Google Chrome count as well, further bloating it? So many unknowns and another reminder of why vulnerability statistics are often misleading or serve no value. Without explaining the methodology, we’re left with guesses and assumptions that strongly suggest this statistic can’t be trusted.
Even more offensive, is that the “vulnerability intelligence experts at Secunia Research” don’t demonstrate any expertise in informing readers why Google Chrome numbers are so high. Instead, they publish the information, withhold details of the methodology, and let the media run wild parroting their pedestrian statistics and understanding. As a lesson to the media, and Secunia, consider these additional pieces of information that help explain those numbers, and why you simple can’t compare disclosed vulnerability totals:
- Google releases details about the vulnerabilities fixed in Chrome, unlike some other browser vendors. For example, Opera releases almost no information. Microsoft typically releases information on the more serious vulnerabilities, and none from their internal auditing. Of the 310 Chrome vulnerabilities we tracked, 66 were CVSSv2 5.0 or less.
- Google has perhaps the most aggressive bug bounty program in the industry, which encourages more researchers to audit their code. How aggressive? They paid out more than US$550,000 in 2014, just for Chrome vulnerabilities.
- Google’s turnaround in fixing Chrome vulnerabilities is quite respectable. Since many of the vulnerabilities were reported to them and fixed promptly, it is easy to argue with the claim it is the “least secure” browser.
- Google fields several teams of security experts that audit their code, including Chrome. They find and fix potential issues before disclosing them. By doing that, they are ensuring the security of the browser, yet effectively getting punished by Secunia for doing so.
- In addition to all of the issues disclosed, a tiny fraction were actually proven to be exploitable. Like many software vendors, they find it is easier and more efficient to spend a small amount of time to fix the possible vulnerability rather than the larger amount of time required to prove it is exploitable.
There are many pitfalls of using simple disclosed vulnerability totals to compare products. This is explained over and over by those familiar with the vulnerability disclosure world, and should be common knowledge to ‘experts’ in vulnerability research. Instead, Secunia not only fuels media articles that aren’t critical of their report, they Tweet little snippets without any context. They also have their partners repeat their statistics, giving them more exposure, misleading the customers of other companies.
Vulnerability statistics can be useful. But they must be presented in a responsible and educated manner to serve their purpose. Those not familiar with vulnerability aggregation and generating the resulting statistics typically do a poor job, and add confusion to the matter. We like to call such people “vulnerability tourists”, and we can now add Secunia to the growing list of them.
[Update: 2015-04-01. One additional quote from the 2010 Secunia Report was added, and clarification of wording regarding the yearly vuln total chart was made.]
I’ve written about coordinated disclosure and the debate around it many times in the past. I like to think that I do so in a way that is above and beyond the usual old debate. This is another blog dedicated to an aspect of “coordinated” disclosure that vendors fail to see. Even when a vendor is proudly waving their own coordination flag, decrying the actions of another vendor, they still miss out on the most obvious.
In order to understand just how absurd these vendors can be, let’s remember what the purpose of “coordinated disclosure” is. At a high level, it is to protect their consumers. The idea is to provide a solution for a security issue at the same time a vulnerability becomes publicly known (or ideally, days before the disclosure). For example, in the link above we see Microsoft complaining that Google disclosed a vulnerability two days before a patch was available, putting their customers at risk. Fair enough, we’re not going to debate how long is enough for such patches. Skip past that.
There is another simple truth about the disclosure cycle that has been outlined plenty of times before. After a vendor patch becomes public, it takes less than 24 hours for a skilled researcher to reverse it to determine what the vulnerability is. From here, it could be a matter of hours or days before functional exploit code is created based on the complexity of the issue. Factor in all of the researchers and criminals capable of doing this, and the worst case scenario is that within very few hours a working exploit is created. Best case scenario, customers may have two or three days.
Years ago, Steve Christey pointed out that multiple vendors had released patches on the same day, leading me to write about how that was problematic. So jump to today, and that has become the reality that organizations face at least once a year. But… it got even worse. On October 14, 2014, customers got to witness the dark side of “coordinated disclosure”, one that these vendors are quick to espouse, but equally quick to disregard themselves. In one day we received 25 Microsoft vulnerabilities, 117 Oracle vulnerabilities, 12 SAP vulnerabilities, 8 Mozilla advisories, 6 adobe vulnerabilities, 1 Cisco vulnerability, 1 Chrome OS vulnerability, 1 Google V8 vulnerability, and 3 Linux Kernel vulnerabilities disclosed. That covers every major IT asset in an organization almost and forces administrators to triage in ways that were unheard of years prior.
Do any of these vendors feel that an IT organization is capable of patching all of that in a single day? Two days? Three days? Is it more likely that a full week would be an impressive task while some organizations must run patches through their own testing before deployment and might get it done in two to four weeks? Do they forget that with these patches, bad guys can reverse them and have working exploit in as little as a day, putting their customers at serious risk?
So basically, these vendors who consistently or frequently release on a Tuesday (e.g. Microsoft, Oracle, Adobe) have been coordinating the exact opposite of what they frequently preach. They are not necessarily helping customers by having scheduled patches. This year, we can look forward to Oracle quarterly patches on April 14 and July 14. Both of which are the “second Tuesday” Microsoft / Adobe patch times. Throw in other vendors like IBM (that has been publishing as many as 150 advisories in 48 hours lately), SAP, Google, Apple, Mozilla, and countless others that release frequently, and administrators are in for a world of hurt.
Oh, did I forget to mention that kicker about all of this? October 14, 2014 has 254 vulnerabilities disclosed. On the same day that the dreaded POODLE vulnerability was disclosed, impacting thousands of different vendors and products. That same day, OpenSSL, perhaps the most oft used SSL library released a patch for the vulnerability as well, perfectly “coordinated” with all of the other issues.
As we approach the pinnacle of U.S. sportsball, I am reminded of the complete scandal from a past Superbowl. No, not the obviously-setup wardrobe malfunction scandal. No, not the one where we might have been subjected to a pre-recorded half-time show. The one in 2013 where
hackers terrorism who-knows-why caused the stadium lights to go out for 34 minutes. That day, and the days after, everyone sure seemed to ‘know’ what happened. Since many were throwing around claims of ‘hacking’ or ‘cyber terrorism’ at the time, this incident caught my attention.
Here’s what we know, with selected highlights:
- February 3, 2013: Superbowl happened.
- February 3, 2013: Anonymous takes credit for the blackout.
- February 3, 2013: Because theories of hacking or terrorism aren’t enough, Mashable comes up with 13 more things that may have caused it.
- February 4, 2013: A day later, we’re once again reminded that “inside sources” are often full of it. Baltimore Sun initial report claimed a “power-intensive” halftime show might have been a factor.
- February 4, 2013: The FBI makes a statement saying that terrorism was not a factor.
- February 4, 2013: We learn that such a failure may have been predicted in 2012.
- February 4, 2013: Of course the outage doesn’t really matter. A little game delay, and it is a “boon for super bowl ratings“, the most critical thing to the corrupt NFL.
- February 4, 2013: By this point, people are pretty sure hackers didn’t do it. They probably didn’t, but they could have!
- February 4, 2013: Oh sorry, it could still be hackers. The Christian Science monitor actually covers the likely reason, yet that isn’t sexy. Chinese hacker ploy seems more reasonable to cover…
- February 4, 2013: Not only Anonymous, but ‘Rustle League’ claimed to hack the super bowl. A day later we learn that notorious Rustle League trolls were … wait for it … trolling.
- February 5, 2013: Officials at Entergy, who provide power for that property clearly state “There was no Internet or remote computer access to the piece of equipment inside the stadium that sensed an abnormality in the electrical system and partially cut power to the Superdome…”
- February 6, 2013: While the Superdome was not hacked on Sunday, the U.S. Federal Reserve was.
- February 8, 2013: Multiple sources begin covering the real reason for the Superdome outage.
- February 8, 2013: We now have a good idea what caused it, but let the blame game begin. Manufacturer error, or user error?
- March 21, 2013: The official Entergy report is released (PDF), giving a very technical analysis and summary of what happened. Everyone but conspiracy theorists can sleep well.
The reason for this blog is that Chris Sistrunk, a noted SCADA security researcher, pinged me the other day about the report. We were curious if the failure described could be considered a vulnerability by OSVDB standards. After reading the report and several questions for him, this seems like a simple case of device malfunction / failure. Quoting relevant bits from the report:
During the testing, behavior of the relay was not entirely consistent with the function described in the instruction manual. Under some circumstances, when the current exceeded the trip
setting and then decreased below the trip setting even after the timer had expired, the relay did not operate.
This instability was observed on all of the relays tested (during testing by this engineer, ENOI, and others in coordination with S&C at Vault 24 on March 1, 2013), including the subject
(Bay 8) relay and two identical (exemplar) relays. Behavior of the device in a manner contrary to the published functionality of the device constitutes a design defect.
Interesting read and glimpse into the world of SCADA / ICS. While the notion that the outage was due to hackers, the reality is far more mundane. We could certainly learn from this case, along with thousands of others… but who am I kidding. News covering the mundane and real doesn’t sell.
Recently, we got feedback via Twitter that we come across as “immature”. On the surface, perhaps. Not all of our Tweets are critical of CVE though. I replied pretty quickly that said criticism is also us “pushing for them to improve since so much of the industry relies on them.” When I Tweeted that, a post to the CVE Editorial Board wasn’t public on the web site, so I couldn’t quote it. But it was a great and timely example of one way our team is pushing CVE to improve.
That said, let me better explain our criticism. It isn’t the first time, it won’t be the last time, but I am not sure if some of these thoughts have been published via blog before. Put simply, we would not be so critical of CVE if it wasn’t a crumbling cornerstone of the Information Security industry. Countless organizations and products use CVE as a bible of public vulnerabilities. A majority of security technology, including firewalls, vulnerability scanners, IDS, IPS, and everything else is built on their database. Our industry assumes they are doing their job, doing their best, and cataloging public vulnerabilities. That simply is not the case, and it hasn’t been for more than a year. Everyone uses it as a benchmark, trusts it, and relies on it. Yet no one questions it except us. Last I checked, our profession was built on “trust but verify“. We verify, thus, we’re critical.
That said, we have a long history of sending corrections, feedback, and improvement ideas to all of the major VDBs including CVE, BID, Secunia, ISS, SecTracker, EDB, PacketStorm, and more. We currently have a great relationship with ISS and EDB. We have had a great-to-courteous relationship with CVE. SecTracker has been receptive of our feedback in the past, but given their minimal output we don’t try to provide cross-references to them anymore. PacketStorm is bad about approving our comments on their published disclosures. BID is and has been a lost cause for almost a decade. Further, we have decent relationships with US-CERT, IBM PSIRT, CERT (CM), and other companies teams. We give continued feedback to some of these organizations that are designed to help their process, help their disclosures, and thus help the industry. I mention this because for the most part, a majority of them are competitors to us. We have a commercial model, it is the only way to fund the database. Despite that, and a decade of disillusionment of the ‘open source’ model, we still give away a significant portion of our data. Until recently, our biggest competitor in licensing our data was ourselves, as potential customers would freely admit they could take our data from osvdb.org. Next to ourselves? CVE and NVD. It is astounding and scary how many companies will pass up on superior vulnerability intelligence because what they are using is free. In many cases, they tell their customers they provide the best intelligence, provide the most security, and a wide variety of other platitudes. In reality, they don’t want to spend a sliver of a fraction of their profits, to truly help their customers. It is a level of greed and unethical behavior that is absolutely disgusting. If I could expose them, I would, but they fall under dreaded NDAs.
Point is, we strive to push all of these organizations to be better. Jake and I gave a presentation back in 2005 at CanSecWest where we said that VDBs need to evolve. They still do. Ten years later, we’re still pushing them to do so while they resist with every ounce of their being. Fortunately, we have been pushing ourselves to be better during that time, and it shows. We’re no more critical of the other VDBs than we are of ourselves. It doesn’t help us one bit. In fact, it only serves to hurt us. Yet, it is the right thing to do for the industry, so we do it.
Nothing like waking up to a new article purporting to show vulnerability statistics and having someone ask us for comment. But hey, we love giving additional perspective on such statistics since they are often without proper context and disclaimers. This morning, the new article comes from Help Net Security and is titled “SQL injection vulnerabilities surge to highest levels in three years“. It cites “DB Networks’ research” who did the usual, parsed NVD data. As we all know, that data comes from CVE who is a frequent topic of rant on Twitter and occasional blogs. Cliff notes: CVE does not promise comprehensive coverage of public disclosures. They openly admit this and Steve Christey has repeatedly said that CVE may not be the best for statistics, even as far back as 2006. Early in 2013, Christey again publicly stated that CVE “can no longer guarantee full coverage of all public vulnerabilities.” I bring this up to remind everyone, again, that it is important to add such disclaimers about your data set, and ultimately your published research.
Getting back to the statistics and DB Research, the second thing I wondered after their data source, was who they were and why they were doing this analysis (SQLi specifically). I probably shouldn’t be surprised to learn this comes over a year after they announced they have an appliance that blocks SQL injection attacks. This too should be disclaimed in any article covering their analysis, as it adds perspective why they are choosing a single vulnerability type, and may also explain why they chose NVD over another data sources (since it fits more neatly into their narrative). Following that, they paid Ponemon to help them conduct a study on the threat of SQL injection. Or wait, was it two of them, the second with a bent towards retail breaches? Here are the results of the first one it seems, which again shows that they have a pretty specific bias toward SQL injection.
Now that we know they have a vested interest in the results of their analysis coming out a specific way, let’s look at the results. First, the Help Net Security article does not describe their methodology, at all. Reading their self-written, paid-for news announcement (PR Newswire) about the analysis, it becomes very clear this is a gimmick for advertising, not actual vulnerability statistics research. It’s 2015, years after Steve Christey and I have both ranted about such statistics, and they don’t explain their methodology. This makes it apparent that “CVE abstraction bias” is possibly the biggest factor here. I have blogged about using CVE/NVD as a dataset before, because it contains one of the biggest pitfalls in such statistic generation.
Rather than debunk these stats directly, since it has been done many times in the past, I can say that they are basically meaningless at this point. Even without their methodology, I am sure someone can trivially reproduce their results and figure out if they abstracted per CVE, or per actual SQLi mentioned. As a recent example, CVE-2014-7137 is a single entry that actually covers 54 distinct SQL injection vulnerabilities. If you count just the CVE candidate versus the vulnerabilities that may be listed within them, your numbers will vary greatly. That said, I will assume that their results can be reproduced since we know their data source and their bias in desired results.
With that in mind, let’s first look at what the numbers look like when using a database that clearly abstracts those issues, and covers a couple thousand sources more than CVE officially does:
“SQL Injection Vulnerabilities Surge to Highest Levels in Three Years” is the title of DB Networks’ press release, and is summarized by Help Net Security as “last year produced the most SQL vulnerabilities identified since 2011 and 104% more than were identified in 2013.” In reality (or at least, using a more comprehensive data set), we see that isn’t the case since the available statistics a) don’t show 2014 being more than 2011 and b) 2011 not holding a candle to 2010. No big surprise really, given that we actually do vulnerability aggregation while NVD and DB Networks does not. But really, I digress. These ‘statistics’ are nothing more than a thinly veiled excuse to further advertise themselves. Notice in the press release they go from the statistics that help justify their products right into the third paragraph quoting the CEO being “truly honored to be selected as a finalist for SC Magazine’s Best Database Security Solution.” He follows that up with another line calling out their specific product that helps “database security in some of the world’s largest mission critical datacenters.”
Yep, these statistics are very transparent. They are based on a convenient data source, maintained by an agency that doesn’t actually aggregate the information, that doesn’t have the experience their data-benefactors have (CVE). They are advertised with a single goal in mind; selling their product. The fact they use the word “research” in the context of generating these statistics is a joke.
As always, I encourage companies and individuals to keep publishing vulnerability statistics. But I stress that it should be done responsibly. Disclaim your data source, explain your methodology, be clear if you are curious about the results coming out one way (bias is fine, just disclaim it), and realize that different data sources will produce different results. Dare to use multiple sources and compare the results, even if it doesn’t fully back your desired opinion. Why? Because if you disclaim your data sources and results, the logical and simple conclusion is that you may still be right. We just don’t have the perfect vulnerability disclosure data source yet. Fortunately, some of us are working harder than others to find that unicorn.
Earlier today, Chris Betz, senior director of the Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC), posted a blog calling for “better coordinated vulnerability disclosure“.
Before I begin a rebuttal of sorts, let me be absolutely clear. The entire OSVDB team is very impressed with Microsoft’s transition over the last decade as far as security response goes. The MSRC has evolved and matured greatly, which is a benefit to both Microsoft and their customers world-wide. This post is not meant to undermine their efforts at large, rather to point out that since day one, propaganda is still a valuable tool for the company. I will preface this with a reminder that this is not a new issue. I have personally blogged about this as far back as 2001, after Scott Culp (Microsoft at the time) wrote a polarizing piece about “information anarchy” that centered around disclosure issues. At some point Microsoft realized this was a bad position to take and that it didn’t endear them to the researchers providing free vulnerability information to them. Despite that, it took almost ten years for Microsoft to drop the term “responsible” disclosure (also biased against researchers) in favor of “coordinated” disclosure. Again, Microsoft has done a phenomenal job advancing their security program, especially the last three to five years. But… it is on the back of a confrontational policy toward researchers.
Reading yesterday’s blog, there are bits and pieces that stand out to me for various reasons. It is easy to gloss over many of these if you aren’t a masochist and spend most of your waking time buried in vulnerability aggregation and related topics.
In terms of the software industry at large and each player’s responsibility, we believe in Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD).
Not sure I have seen “CVD” as a formal initialism until now, which is interesting. After trying to brand “information anarchy” and pushing the “responsible disclosure” term, good to see you embrace a better term.
Ultimately, vulnerability collaboration between researchers and vendors is about limiting the field of opportunity so customers and their data are better protected against cyberattacks.
And this line, early on in the blog, demonstrates you do not live in the real world of vulnerability disclosure. Microsoft has enjoyed their ‘ivory’ tower so to speak. Many researchers find and disclose vulnerabilities for entirely selfish reasons (e.g. bug bounties), which you basically do not offer. Yes, you have a bounty program, but it is very different from most and does not reward a vast majority of vulnerabilities reported to you. Microsoft has done well in creating a culture of “report vulnerabilities to us for free for the honor of being mentioned in one of our advisories”. And I get that! Being listed as a creditee in a Microsoft advisory is advertising itself as far as researcher talent. However… you are talking about a minority of researchers in the greater picture, that chase that honor.
Those in favor of full, public disclosure believe that this method pushes software vendors to fix vulnerabilities more quickly and makes customers develop and take actions to protect themselves. We disagree.
Oh sorry, let me qualify, your black and white tower. This absolutely does work for some vendors, especially those who have a poor history in dealing with vulnerability reports. You may not be one of them for the last 10 years, but you once were. Back in the late ’90s, Microsoft had a reputation for being horrible when dealing with researchers. No vulnerability disclosure policy, no bug bounty (even five years after Netscape had implemented one), and no standard process for receiving and addressing reports. Yes, you have a formal and mature process now, but many of us in the industry remember your beginnings.
It is necessary to fully assess the potential vulnerability, design and evaluate against the broader threat landscape, and issue a “fix” before it is disclosed to the public, including those who would use the vulnerability to orchestrate an attack.
This is a great point. But, let’s read on and offer some context using your own words…
Of the vulnerabilities privately disclosed through coordinated disclosure practices and fixed each year by all software vendors, we have found that almost none are exploited before a “fix” has been provided to customers, and even after a “fix” is made publicly available only a very small amount are ever exploited.
Wait, if only a very small amount of vulnerabilities are exploited after a fix, and ‘almost none’ are exploited before a fix… why do you care if it is coordinated? You essentially invalidate any argument for a researcher coordinating disclosure with you. Why do they care if you clearly state that coordination doesn’t matter, and that the vulnerability will “almost [never]” be exploited? You can’t have this both ways.
CVD philosophy and action is playing out today as one company – Google – has released information about a vulnerability in a Microsoft product, two days before our planned fix on our well known and coordinated Patch Tuesday cadence, despite our request that they avoid doing so.
And this is where you move from propaganda to an outright lie. The issue in question was disclosed on December 29, 2014. That is 15 days, not two days, before your January patch Tuesday. I’d love to hold my breath waiting for MSRC or Betz to explain this minor ’rounding error’ on dates, but I have a feeling I would come out on the losing side. Or is Microsoft simply not aware of public vulnerability disclosures and should perhaps invest in a solution for such vulnerability intelligence? Yes, blatant sales opportunity, but they are desperately begging for it given this statement. =)
[Update. Apparently Microsoft is unhappy over Issue 123 which was auto-published on January 11, as opposed to Issue 118 linked above auto-published on December 29. So they are correct on two days, but curious they aren’t complaining over 118 at the same time when both are local privilege escalation vulnerabilities.]
One could also argue that this is a local privilege escalation vulnerability, which requires a level of access to exploit that simply does not apply to a majority of Windows users. Betz goes on to say that software is complicated (it is), and that not every vulnerability is equal (also true), but also glosses over the fact that Google is in the same boat they are. A little over four years ago, the Google security team posted a blog talking about “rebooting” responsible disclosure and say this:
As software engineers, we understand the pain of trying to fix, test and release a product rapidly; this especially applies to widely-deployed and complicated client software. Recognizing this, we put a lot of effort into keeping our release processes agile so that security fixes can be pushed out to users as quickly as possible.
To be fair, Google also did not publish a timeline of any sorts with this disclosure. We don’t know anything that happened after the September 30, 2014 report to Microsoft. Did you ask for more time Google? Did Microsoft say it was being patched in January? If so, you look like total assholes, disclosure policy be damned. If they didn’t mentioned January specifically and only asked for more time, maybe it was fair you kept to your schedule. One of the two parties should publish all of the correspondence now. What’s the harm, the issue is public! Come on.. someone show their cards, prove the other wrong. Back to Microsoft’s blog…
What’s right for Google is not always right for customers.
This is absolutely true. But you forgot the important qualifier; what is is right for Microsoft, is not always right for customers.
For example, look at CVE-2010-3889 (heavily referenced) aka “Microsoft Windows on 32-bit win32k.sys Keyboard Layout Loading Local Privilege Escalation”. This is one of four vulnerabilities used by Stuxnet. Unfortunately, Microsoft has no clear answer if this is even patched, four years later. That CVE identifier doesn’t seem to exist in any Microsoft security advisory. Why not? Did you really let a vulnerability that may have aided an attack on an Iranian nuclear power plant go unpatched? Think of the ethics questions there! Or is this a case of the Microsoft security response process not being as mature as I give them credit, and this is a dupe of CVE-2010-2743? Why does it take a third-party four years to figure this out while writing a blog on a whim?
It is a zero sum game where all parties end up injured.
What does this even mean, other than propaganda? It is rarely, if ever, a case where “all parties” are injured. If a researcher discloses something to you and publishes prematurely, or publishes on their own without contacting you, usually that party is not ‘injured’ in doing so. That is simple fact.
Betz’ blog goes on to quote the Microsoft CVD policy which states:
Microsoft’s Approach to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
Under the principle of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, finders disclose newly discovered vulnerabilities in hardware, software, and services directly to the vendors of the affected product; to a national CERT or other coordinator who will report to the vendor privately; or to a private service that will likewise report to the vendor privately.
Perhaps you should qualify that statement, as US-CERT has a 45 day disclosure policy in most cases. That is half the time Google gave you. Quoting from the US-CERT policy:
Q: Will all vulnerabilities be disclosed within 45 days?
A: No. There may often be circumstances that will cause us to adjust our publication schedule. Threats that are especially serious or for which we have evidence of exploitation will likely cause us to shorten our release schedule. Threats that require “hard” changes (changes to standards, changes to core operating system components) will cause us to extend our publication schedule. We may not publish every vulnerability that is reported to us.
Note that it does not qualify “the vendor asks for more time”. That is the United States government saying a vendor gets 45 days to patch with rare exception. Oh wait Mr. Betz, before you go quoting “changes to core operating system components”, I will stop you there. Vulnerabilities in win32k.sys are not new. That 3.1 meg binary (on Windows 7) is the cause for a lot of grief for Windows users in that file alone. Given that history, you cannot say that changes to that file meet the US-CERT criteria.
Finally, this isn’t the first pissing match between Google and Microsoft on vulnerability disclosure. While Microsoft has routinely played the victim card and Google certainly seems more aggressive on their disclosure policy, there is a more than one bit of irony if one looks deeper. In random order…
Microsoft disclosed a vulnerability in Google Chrome, but didn’t do proper research. This vulnerability may be in WebKit as one person notes, meaning it could affect other browsers like Apple Safari. If it does, then Apple would get blindsided in this disclosure, and it would not be ‘coordinated’ or ‘responsible’, and would qualify as ‘information anarchy’ as Microsoft once called it. While we don’t know if it was ultimately in WebKit, we do know this vulnerability exists because Google Chrome was trying to work around issues with Microsoft software.
Look at MSVR11-011 and MSVR11-012 from 2011, where Microsoft “coordinated” two vulnerabilities with the FFmpeg team. To be sure, the FFmpeg team is outstanding at responding to and fixing vulnerabilities. However, in the real world, there are thousands of vendors that use FFmpeg as a library in their own products. While it may have been fixed in the base code, it can easily take somewhere between months and a decade for vendors to learn about and upgrade the library in their software. Only in a completely naive world could Microsoft call this “coordinated”.
Even better, let’s go back to the inaugural Microsoft Vulnerability Research (MSVR) advisory, MSVR11-001. This was a “Use-After-Free Object Lifetime Vulnerability in Chrome” that in reality was a vulnerability in WebKit, the underlying rendering library used by Chrome. The problem is that WebKit is used by a lot more than Chrome. So the first advisory from MSVR conveniently targets a Google product, but completely botches the “coordinated” disclosure, going to a single vendor using WebKit code, because the Microsoft researchers apparently didn’t diagnose the problem fully. No big deal right?
Wrong. I am sure Adobe, Samsung, Amazon, Tizen, Symbian, BlackBerry, Midori, and Android web browser users would disagree strongly. Do you really want to compare the number of users you blindsided with this “coordinated” disclosure to the ones you protected? Microsoft was a bigger jackass on this disclosure than Google ever was, plain and simple.
Finally, do I even need to go into the absolute mess than you call the “Advanced Notification Service” (ANS)? In case readers aren’t aware, this is not a single program. This is several different programs with various names like MAPP and others. Just three days ago, you Mr. Betz announced that ANS was changing. This is after another program got changed drastically, multiple companies were kicked out of the MAPP program, and who knows what else happened. All of which was founded on Microsoft giving advanced and sometimes detailed vulnerability information to questionable companies, that may not be friendly parties.
The entire notion of “coordinated” disclosure went out the window as far as Microsoft goes, when they first implemented these programs. You specifically gave a very limited number of organizations details about vulnerabilities, before other customers had access. That, by definition, is not coordination. That is favoritism in the name of the bottom line, and speaks strongly against any intent you outline in yesterday’s blog post.
While Microsoft has taken great effort to improve their security process, it is disingenuous to call this anything but propaganda.