I’ve written about coordinated disclosure and the debate around it many times in the past. I like to think that I do so in a way that is above and beyond the usual old debate. This is another blog dedicated to an aspect of “coordinated” disclosure that vendors fail to see. Even when a vendor is proudly waving their own coordination flag, decrying the actions of another vendor, they still miss out on the most obvious.
In order to understand just how absurd these vendors can be, let’s remember what the purpose of “coordinated disclosure” is. At a high level, it is to protect their consumers. The idea is to provide a solution for a security issue at the same time a vulnerability becomes publicly known (or ideally, days before the disclosure). For example, in the link above we see Microsoft complaining that Google disclosed a vulnerability two days before a patch was available, putting their customers at risk. Fair enough, we’re not going to debate how long is enough for such patches. Skip past that.
There is another simple truth about the disclosure cycle that has been outlined plenty of times before. After a vendor patch becomes public, it takes less than 24 hours for a skilled researcher to reverse it to determine what the vulnerability is. From here, it could be a matter of hours or days before functional exploit code is created based on the complexity of the issue. Factor in all of the researchers and criminals capable of doing this, and the worst case scenario is that within very few hours a working exploit is created. Best case scenario, customers may have two or three days.
Years ago, Steve Christey pointed out that multiple vendors had released patches on the same day, leading me to write about how that was problematic. So jump to today, and that has become the reality that organizations face at least once a year. But… it got even worse. On October 14, 2014, customers got to witness the dark side of “coordinated disclosure”, one that these vendors are quick to espouse, but equally quick to disregard themselves. In one day we received 25 Microsoft vulnerabilities, 117 Oracle vulnerabilities, 12 SAP vulnerabilities, 8 Mozilla advisories, 6 adobe vulnerabilities, 1 Cisco vulnerability, 1 Chrome OS vulnerability, 1 Google V8 vulnerability, and 3 Linux Kernel vulnerabilities disclosed. That covers every major IT asset in an organization almost and forces administrators to triage in ways that were unheard of years prior.
Do any of these vendors feel that an IT organization is capable of patching all of that in a single day? Two days? Three days? Is it more likely that a full week would be an impressive task while some organizations must run patches through their own testing before deployment and might get it done in two to four weeks? Do they forget that with these patches, bad guys can reverse them and have working exploit in as little as a day, putting their customers at serious risk?
So basically, these vendors who consistently or frequently release on a Tuesday (e.g. Microsoft, Oracle, Adobe) have been coordinating the exact opposite of what they frequently preach. They are not necessarily helping customers by having scheduled patches. This year, we can look forward to Oracle quarterly patches on April 14 and July 14. Both of which are the “second Tuesday” Microsoft / Adobe patch times. Throw in other vendors like IBM (that has been publishing as many as 150 advisories in 48 hours lately), SAP, Google, Apple, Mozilla, and countless others that release frequently, and administrators are in for a world of hurt.
Oh, did I forget to mention that kicker about all of this? October 14, 2014 has 254 vulnerabilities disclosed. On the same day that the dreaded POODLE vulnerability was disclosed, impacting thousands of different vendors and products. That same day, OpenSSL, perhaps the most oft used SSL library released a patch for the vulnerability as well, perfectly “coordinated” with all of the other issues.