Zero Day Vulnerabilities - Sell Your Soul?

Posted by jericho Tue, 26 Jul 2005 21:58:53 GMT

There have been several Vulnerability Sharing Clubs (VSC) in the past including iDefense, Immunity and others. For those who question this business model, consider Verisign just purchased iDefense for US $40 million. Still not a believer? Consider 3Com/TippingPoint is now offering a new VSC called the Zero Day Initiative. Now instead of just selling an exploit for cash, you can earn points and trade them in for cash and prizes! Since this new program is being lead by David Endler, who was an early participant in the creation of the iDefense VSC, this business model appears to be very sound (for the time being). In response, iDefense/Verisign has announce that not only is it continuing their program, it is beefing it up and offering more money for the 0-day. For the skeptics out there, you are not alone. Frank Knobbe wrote a really good response to the 3com/TP announcement, questioning the nature of the vulnerabilities that would be shared. I tend to agree with many points of this.

Other random thoughts:

  • VSCs typically receive a 0-day vulnerability, share the info with their clients, then disclose the vuln to the vendor, give them all the time they want for a patch and eventually publish the information (presumably when it has little/no value). Verisign may now give iDefense a better opportunity to know when the 0-day is worthless via its customer networks they monitor. Once they see the vulnerability in the wild, they know it isn’t 0-day and the value drops.
  • With the above model in mind, we now know the Verisign doesn’t care about the ethical delimma of having 0-day vulnerability information, and not immediately disclosing it to the vendor. Even if they do share with the vendor immediately, they also share this information with clients who can leak the information out to other people.
  • With the above model in mind, we know that 3com/TippingPoint also doesn’t care about the ethical delimma.
  • Is this the start of a trend regarding vulnerabilities, disclosure and the bottom line?
  • Will this be the precursor to half a dozen other companies offering similar programs?
  • If there are a dozen VSCs like this, are the vendors expected to pay for the information to receive it before the VSC decides to “responsibly disclose” said information to the vendor? (Remember, the vuln info usually stays in the hands of the VSC and it’s clients for months before vendor notification)

Posted in  | no comments

Economic Analysis of Incentives to Disclose Software Vulnerabilities

Posted by jericho Mon, 20 Jun 2005 22:39:11 GMT

http://infosecon.net/workshop/pdf/20.pdf Economic Analysis of Incentives to Disclose Software Vulnerabilities by Dmitri Nizovtsev and Marie Thursby

Abstract

This paper addresses the ongoing debate about the practice of disclosing information about software vulnerabilities through an open public forum. Using game-theoretic approach, we show that such practice may be an equilibrium strategy in a game played by rational loss-minimizing agents. We find that under certain parameters public disclosure of vulnerabilities is desirable from the social welfare standpoint. The presence of an opportunity to disclose allows individual software users to reduce their expected loss from attacks and by doing so improves social welfare. We analyze the effect of several product characteristics and the composition of the pool of software users on the decisions to disclose and on social welfare and compare several public policy alternatives in terms of their efficacy in reducing the overall social welfare loss from attacks. Our results suggest that designing an incentive system that would induce vendors to release fixes sooner and improve the quality of their products should be among the priorities for any policymaking agency concerned with information security. Doing so would reduce individual incentives to disclose vulnerabilities, thus further reducing the potential damage from any given vulnerability.

Our preliminary analysis of information-sharing coalitions suggests that such entities have a positive effect only under a fairly restrictive set of conditions.

Posted in  | no comments

Older posts: 1 2