Our sponsor Risk Based Security (RBS) posted an interesting blog this morning about Research In Motion (RIM), creator of the BlackBerry device. The behavior outlined in the blog, and from the original blog by Frank Rieger is shocking to say the least. In addition to the vulnerability outlined, potentially sending credentials in cleartext, this begs the question of legality. Quickly skimming the BlackBerry enterprise end-user license agreement (EULA), there doesn’t appear to be any warning that the credentials are transmitted back to RIM, or that they will authenticate to your mail server.
If the EULA does not contain explicit wording that outlines this behavior, it begs the question of the legality of RIM’s actions. Regardless of their intention, wether trying to claim that it is covered in the EULA or making it easier to use their device, this activity is inexcusable. Without permission, unauthorized possession of authentication credentials is a violation of Title 18 USC § 1030 law, section (a)(2)(C) and potentially others depending on the purpose of the computer. Since the server doing this resides in Canada, RIM may be subject to Canadian law and their activity appears to violate Section 342.1 (d). Given the U.S. government’s adoption of BlackBerry devices, if RIM is authenticating to U.S. government servers during this process, this could get really messy.
Any time a user performs an action that would result in sharing that type of information, with any third party, the device or application should give explicit warning and require the user to not only opt-in, but confirm their choice. No exceptions.
Since vulnerabilities are a cornerstone of computer crime, stats on it are of interest to us. Statistics on cybercrime have always been dodgy; more so than real-world crime statistics. When your car is broken into or stolen, you know it. More often than not, you will report it to the police. In the computer world, an un-measurable number of intrusions happen every day. The rate of malware infection, DoS attacks, and other virtual crimes are not only
difficult impossible to measure, they potentially go unreported more often than not.
Classically, the only number thrown around regarding damages from cybercrime has been this mythical one trillion dollars. Yes, with a ‘T’, not a ‘B’. That number has been challenged by many in the past, but no one has offered a better number with anything remotely factual. On July 22 the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a new study commissioned by McAfee (who previously quoted the trillion dollar figure) saying that damages are much less. From a Los Angeles Times article on the release:
Cyberattacks may be draining as much as $140 billion and half a million jobs from the U.S. economy each year, according to a new study that splashes water on a previous estimate of $1 trillion in annual losses.
“That’s our best guess,” said James Andrew Lewis, the director of the technology and public policy program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
James Andrew Lewis’ comment calling it a “best guess” is not assuring. The one trillion dollar figure cited for all those years was no better than a guess, as the surveys it relied on were far from a solid methodology. Regardless, the figure of $140 billion seems more rationale on the surface. Contrasting that is the claim that half a million jobs are “drained” from the U.S. economy each year. How can cybercrime conceivably lead to that? Reading on in the article:
Lewis and co-author Stewart Baker, a distinguished visiting fellow at CSIS, said that they were still working to determine cybercrime’s impact on innovation. They suggested a follow-up report might come out with a bigger number.
But preliminarily, they found U.S. losses to be somewhere between $20 billion to $140 billion, or about 1% of the nation’s GDP. They pegged job losses at 508,000.
“The effect of the net loss of jobs could be small, but if a good portion of these jobs were high-end manufacturing jobs that moved overseas because of intellectual property losses, the effect could be wide ranging,” Lewis said.
Right after the hint of a more rational number, CSIS immediately makes it a worthless number when they say it is really somewhere between $20 billion and $140 billion. In the world of sanity and statistics, that range is unreasonable. Further, Lewis goes on to say that some of the 508,000 jobs lost are due to “high-end manufacturing jobs moved overseas because of intellectual property losses”. Huh? High-end manufacturing jobs are moving overseas because of corporate budgets more than cybercrime. Such a claim should be backed up by a long list of examples showing companies losing intellectual property, and then reporting it to law enforcement or their shareholders, as well as SEC filings.
We moved from the fictional trillion number, to an overly wide range in the tens or hundreds of billions, and got an odd claim of half a million jobs lost due to cybercrime. This new study did little to clear things up.
If we’re killing one cybercrime myth, let’s kill another — one which coincidentally emerged from McAfee — namely that the wealth transfer due to hacking represents some historically-unprecedented economic disaster.
Ultimately, we also have to remember that any cybercrime statistics coming from a company like McAfee are suspect, as they directly benefit them while they sell computer security solutions.
About two weeks ago, another round of vulnerability stats got passed around. Like others before, it claims to use CVE to compare Apple iOS versus Android in an attempt to establish which is more secure based on “vulnerability counts”. The statistics put forth are basically meaningless, because like most people using a VDB to generate stats, they don’t fully understand their data source. This is one type of bias that enters the picture when generating statistics, and one of many points Steve Christey (MITRE/CVE) and I will be making next week at BlackHat (Wednesday afternoon).
As with other vulnerability statistics, I will debunk the latest by showing why the conclusions are not based on a solid understanding of vulnerabilities, or vulnerability data sources. The post is published on The Verge, written by ‘Mechanicix’. The results match last year’s Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (as mentioned in the comments), as well as the results published this year by Sourcefire in their paper titled “25 Years of Security Vulns“. In all three cases, they use the same data set (CVE), and do the same rudimentary counting to reach their results.
The gist of the finding is that Apple iOS is considerably less secure than Android, as iOS had 238 reported vulnerabilities versus the 27 reported in Android, based on CVE and illustrated through CVEdetails.com.
Total iOS Vulnerabilities 2007-2013: 238
Total Android Vulnerabilities 2009-2013: 27
Keeping in mind those numbers, if you look at the CVE entries that are included, a number of problems are obvious:
- We see that the comparison timeframes differ by two years. There are at least 3 vulnerabilities in Android SDK reported before 2009, two of which have CVEs (CVE-2008-0985 and CVE-2008-0986).
- These totals are based on CVE identifiers, which does not necessarily reflect a 1-to-1 vulnerability mapping, as they document. You absolutely cannot count CVE as a substitute for vulnerabilities, they are not the same.
- The vulnerability totals are incorrect due to using CVE, a data source that has serious gaps in coverage. For example, OSVDB has 71 documented vulnerabilities for Android, and we do not make any claims that our coverage is complete.
- The iOS results include vulnerabilities in WebKit, the framework iOS Safari uses. This is problematic for several reasons.
- First, that means Mechanicix is now comparing the Android OS to the iOS operating system and applications.
- Second, WebKit vulnerabilities account for 109 of the CVE results, almost half of the total reported.
- Third, if they did count WebKit intentionally then the numbers are way off as there were around 700 WebKit vulnerabilities reported in that time frame.
- Fourth, the default browser in Android uses WebKit, yet they weren’t counted against that platform.
- The results include 16 vulnerabilities in Safari itself (or in WebKit and just not diagnosed as such), the default browser.
- At least 4 of the 238 are vulnerabilities in Google Chrome (as opposed to WebKit) with no mention of iOS in the CVE.
- A wide variety of iOS applications are included in the list including Office Viewer, iMessage, Mail, Broadcom BCM4325 and BCM4329 Wi-Fi chips, Calendar, FreeType, libxslt, and more.
When you factor in all of the above, Android likely comes out on top for the number of vulnerabilities when comparing the operating systems. Once again, vulnerability statistics seem simple on the surface. When you consider the above, and further consider that there are likely more points that influence vulnerability counts, we see that it is anything other than simple.
The market for vulnerabilities has grown rapidly the last five years. While the market is certainly not new, going back well over ten years, more organizations are interested in acquiring 0-day / private vulnerabilities for a variety of needs. These vulnerabilities cover the gambit in applications and impacts, and range from the tens of dollars to $100,000 or more. While such transactions are sometimes public, high-end vulnerabilities that sell for large sums generally are not a matter of public record. That makes it difficult to track actual sale prices to gauge the value of such vulnerabilities.
In the vulnerability market place, the seller has the power. If they hold a 0-day vulnerability that is in demand, they can set their own price. For the few vulnerability brokers out there, the perception of vulnerability value is critical for their business. In March, 2013, a Forbes piece by Andy Greenberg covered this topic and told of the sale of an iOS vulnerability that allegedly sold for $250,000.
Even with the $250,000 payout [the Grugq] elicited for that deal, he wonders if he could have gotten more. “I think I lowballed it,” he wrote to me at one point in the dealmaking process. “The client was too happy.”
As expected, there is no validation of the claim of the sale. The price tag comes from the vulnerability broker who has an interest in making such prices public, even if they are exaggerated. Jump to July, 2013, and a New York Times article by Nicole Perlroth and David Sanger makes a vague reference to an iOS vulnerability that sold for $500,000.
Apple still has no such program, but its vulnerabilities are some of the most coveted. In one case, a zero-day exploit in Apple’s iOS operating system sold for $500,000, according to two people briefed on the sale.
Given the vague details, it is fairly safe to assume that it references the iOS vulnerability sale from a year earlier. The NY Times article sources many people regarding vulnerability value, including thegrugq on the first page. This means the vague reference to the “two people briefed on the sale” were likely people briefed by thegrugq as well. Ultimately, this means that both articles and both figures, all source to the same person who has a decided interest in publishing high numbers. Without any detail, the journalists could have contacted one or both sources via email, meaning they could have just as well been thegrugq himself.
I find it interesting that in the span of 1 year and 4 months, the price of that iOS vulnerability jumped from $250,000 to $500,000. More to the point, the original $250,000 price is way out of the league of the prices of vulnerabilities at that time, on any market. Some of us were speculating that a (truly) remote vulnerability in a default Windows installation would go for around $100,000, maybe more. Even if you double our suspected price, it wouldn’t surprise me that a nation-state with a budget would purchase for that amount. But an iOS vulnerability, even remote without user interaction, a year ago? That doesn’t make sense given the user-base and distribution.
Even more interesting, consider that 4 days after the NYTimes article, another outlet was reporting the original $250,000 price.
As I mentioned before, none of this is close to being verified. The only source on record, is someone who directly benefits from the perception that the price of that vulnerability is exceedingly high. Creating the market place value of vulnerabilities through main-stream media is brilliant on his part, if what I suspect is true. Of course, it also speaks to the state of journalism that seemingly no one tried to verify this beyond word-of-mouth.